Digital IDs with ZK: Buterin warns of risks to pseudonymity, potential coercion, and structural flaws. In his opinion, the “one ID per person” model compromises pseudonymity and enables the possibility of pressure, and even a ZK wrapper doesn’t protect against coercion to disclose private keys. At the same time, Buterin not only criticizes but also proposes a potential solution. He asserts that identity based on social graphs and decentralized sources can provide a balance between privacy and scalability.

Buterin Stands Guard Over Anonymity – Digital IDs with ZK Are Not the Best Solution

Vitalik Buterin’s withdrawal from the management of the Ethereum Foundation, along with other reshuffles and initiatives, and his transition into technical research remain in effect. Once again, Buterin criticizes existing approaches but also proposes solutions. 

Before diving into the topic, I highly suggest you learn our clear and comprehensive guide on Decentralized Identity: How Web3 Identity Solutions Safeguard Your Personal Data?

So, Buterin notes that:

Digital IDs with privacy protection via zero-knowledge proofs (ZK), as in projects like World ID, EU, and Taiwan ZK-passports, create only an illusion of complete security. The ZK wrapper itself does not solve the main problem – the risks are not related to the privacy mechanism but to the one-identity-per-person property. In particular, he highlights:

• It lowers the level of pseudonymity, as users can have only one account per platform.
• It makes people vulnerable to coercion (e.g., by government bodies or employers) to reveal their secret s.
• It does not eliminate structural flaws, such as the inability to verify stateless individuals or abuse of multiple citizenships.

According to Buterin, even if all ZK protocols are implemented perfectly, platforms tend to make “pragmatic” decisions. This means, for example, retaining a persistent user identifier instead of rotating keys, which leads to the de facto loss of anonymity.

One might consider an alternative, the other extreme is relying entirely on proof-of-wealth as an anti-sybil mechanism, where creating each account requires money. However, Buterin also expresses doubts about this model, particularly:

• In UBI scenarios (token or service distribution), it excludes those in need.
• In voting and governance architectures, it gives whales outsized influence due to their significantly greater motivation and resources.

He emphasizes that both UBI and governance require a more nuanced model: the ability to scale identity without direct correlation to capital, and without a fixed number of accounts that can be easily revealed under pressure.

Where’s the Balance? Buterin Proposes Pluralistic Identity and the N Identities at the Cost of the N² Model

As a real-world solution, Buterin proposes a pluralistic identity, which can be:

• Explicit – based on social graphs and mutual attestations within communities (e.g., Circles).
• Implicit identity can involve multiple independent ID providers (Google, Twitter, government services, etc.), none of which are required or dominant.

He emphasizes that this model provides:

• Scalability – through a distributed architecture
• Pseudonymity – via independent profiles, gradually building up a reputation
• Resilience – due to the multiplicity of sources and the impossibility of straightforward coercion

From a math perspective, he proposes a compromise model where the cost of obtaining N IDs should grow quadratically, as N². This creates a robust barrier against multi-account attacks while preserving accessibility for honest users.

Conclusion

Criticism of existing solutions is healthy – it’s an opportunity to reconsider and improve them. And the presence of alternative proposals is even better. Yes, they may deserve scrutiny too, but perhaps at the intersection, one can find an ideal model that satisfies all criteria with minimal compromises. Stay tuned for the latest updates in crypto and opportunities in DeFi.